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INTRODUCTION
Mediation has become very common in the USA
and Australia—at least partly because of court-mandated
mediation initiatives.1 Lawyers often represent clients at
mediations, so the increased use of mediation makes it
important to understand how both jurisdictions regulate
lawyers’ advocacy on behalf of their clients during
mediation.
This article comparatively analyzes how
professional standards regulate the truthfulness of lawyers’
advocacy during mediation in Australia and the United
States.
It focuses on uniform regulation in those
jurisdictions.
Part One will comparatively analyze the relevant
regulations in Australia and the United States, and the types
of obligations contained in those regulations—for example,
obligations of truthfulness and good faith. Part Two will
examine the impact of these standards in shaping lawyers’
conduct during mediation in Australia and the United States
and suggest some measures that might be taken by regulators
to more effectively control lawyers’ advocacy in mediation.
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine how
truthfulness of advocacy in mediation is affected by the
threat of common law actions (such as negligent
misstatement or misrepresentation). Such common law
actions differ across the fifty states of the United States and
1
See The Honourable Thomas Bathurst AC, Chief Justice of New South Wales,
Off with the Wig: Issues that Arise for Advocates When Switching from the
Courtroom to the Negotiating Table, Speech at the Australian Disputes Centre
1-2
(March
30,
2017)
(http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speech
es/2017%20Speeches/Bathurst%20CJ/Bathurst_20170330.pdf); Dorcas Quek,
Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of
Implementing a Court-mandated Mediation Program, 11 CARDOZO J. OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 479, 479–80 (2010).
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the seven Australian states. They are too unwieldy to even
summarize in this article.
It is also beyond the scope of this article to examine
how remedies under consumer protection statutes regulate
truthfulness in mediation advocacy (such as the Australian
Consumer Law in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010
(Cth) (“ACL”), and the United States Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”)).2 However, given
that there are only two primary statutes across both
jurisdictions, their impact on lawyers’ conduct will be
briefly noted. In Australia, section 18 of the ACL prohibits
conduct in trade or commerce that is misleading or
deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive.3 It was initially
introduced as section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth). In its present form, section 18 applies to lawyers
representing clients at mediations,4 and it cannot be excluded
by a contract or agreement.5 It has generated thousands of
relevant decisions which have led to a general upgrading of
corporate and legal mores surrounding mediation and
negotiation in Australia.6
In the United States, section 5(1) of the FTC Act
prohibits unfair and deceptive acts and practices in or
affecting commerce.7 As the provision requires proof of
2

Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 4(1) (Austrl.); 63 Cong. Ch. 311
(1917).
3
Note that section 4(1) of the ACL also prohibits representations made by
lawyers about future matters which are not based on reasonable grounds (e.g.
where a lawyer says “my client won’t be making any further settlement offers”
without firm instructions to that effect from the client). Australian Consumer
Law 2010 (Cth) s 4(1) (Austrl.).
4
See Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 2 (Austrl.) (defining “trade and
commerce” and “services”).
5
See Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 96 (Austrl.) (providing that it “has
effect despite any stipulation in any contract or agreement to the contrary”).
6
This is exemplified by the expansion of Australia’s leading annotated version
of the ACL, Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated,
from 246 pages in 1979 (1st edition) to approximately 2,406 pages in 2020 (42d
edition).
7
15 U.S.C.A. § 45.
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unfairness in addition to deception (because of the word
“and”) and does not prohibit conduct which is “likely to”
have the prohibited effect, it less stringently regulates
lawyers’ truthfulness than the ACL.8 For example, a
lawyers’ statement that is “likely to deceive” would not be
prohibited under the FTC Act but would be prohibited by the
ACL.
Neither the FTC Act nor ACL impose penalties for
breach like the relevant ethical rules. However, they may
expose lawyers and their clients in mediation to a suite of
possible remedies such as damages and the revocation of any
agreement induced by unlawful conduct.
1)

RELEVANT
STANDARDS
OF
CONDUCT
This part analyzes the primary regulation of the
truthfulness of lawyers’ advocacy during mediation in each
jurisdiction. In the United States, this regulation is the
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (“Model Rules”). In Australia, it is the Legal
Profession Uniform Conduct (Solicitors) Rules 2015
(“Solicitors Rules”) and Legal Profession Uniform Conduct
(Barristers) Rules 2015 (“Barristers Rules”).9 Given the
length of this article, there will be little attention given to
specific statutes in Australia and the United States (such as
the ACL and FTC – as above), rules of civil procedure, and
court rules regulating conduct during mediation. However,
they are noted for completeness.
8

See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 45.
See generally Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct
Rules
2015
(Cth),
https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/sl-20150244#statusinformation [hereinafter Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules
2015]; Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 (Cth),
https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/sl-2015-0243
[hereinafter Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015].
9
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By way of background, the Model Rules were
adopted by the American Bar Association’s House of
Delegates in 1983 and have been adopted by all states except
California.10 Adoption by a state renders them binding on
lawyers in that state. Some states have slightly amended the
Model Rules in adopting them. It is beyond the scope of this
article to assess each state’s version of the Model Rules—
particularly because this task has already been completed by
the ABA which provides comparative tables on its website
explaining the differences between the Model Rules and the
equivalent rule in each state.11 In addition to the states, many
federal district courts have indirectly adopted the Model
Rules by holding that the state rules are binding in the federal
district in which they sit, and some federal district courts
have directly adopted them where state law is silent on
certain issues.12
In Australia, the profession consists of both
solicitors and barristers (the specialist court-room
advocates). There are separate but similar rules for barristers
and solicitors. For solicitors, a model regime was developed
by the Law Council of Australia and promulgated in June
2011.13 Each state except Tasmania and Western Australia
has adopted the model rules for solicitors, and each state bar
association has separate rules for their barristers. As with

10

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/.
11
See generally Additional Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility
AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOCIATION,
Resources,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/lin
ks_of_interest/.
12
Tonia Lucio, Standards and Regulation of Professional Conduct in Federal
Practice, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, July 2017, at 50, 51–52.
13
LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, Guidelines For Lawyers in Mediation (August
2011)
https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/docs/74c9c71f-0641-e711-93fb005056be13b5/1108-Policy-Guideline-Guidelines-for-Lawyers-inMediations.pdf.
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the Model Rules, adoption of the Solicitors Rules and
Barristers Rules by a state renders them binding.
Neither the Model Rules, Solicitors Rules, nor the
Barristers Rules expressly apply to mediation advocacy.14
Perhaps because advocacy by lawyers at mediations has
become common only recently, there are also no binding
additional or supplementary rules of conduct governing
lawyers acting as legal representatives during mediation in
Australia or the United States.15 As a result, the ethical
obligations of mediation advocates are derived solely from
the generally applicable professional conduct rules (i.e. the
Model Rules, Solicitors Rules and Barristers Rules).
In the United States, there has been some attempt at
expressly regulating conduct during mediations via the
Uniform Mediation Act.16 However, this does not purport to
regulate the conduct of parties beyond issues of
confidentiality and enforcement of mediation agreements,17
and does not address ethical issues relating to truthfulness.
In Australia, there are non-binding standards for lawyers in
mediation released by the Law Society of New South Wales
and Law Council of Australia,18 which set out expectations
of lawyers’ conduct during mediation. While they are nonbinding (so a breach cannot lead to disciplinary action), they
remain helpful because they are the only mediation-specific
14
Bobette Wolski, The Evaluation of the Current Rules of Professional Conduct
Governing Legal Representatives in Mediation in Australia and the Unites
States and a Range of Proposed Alternative 'Non-Adversarial' Ethics Systems
for Lawyers (August 2011) (Ph.D. thesis, Bond University) (on file with Bond
University) at 25.
15
See generally Wolski, supra note 14.
16
E.g., Uniform Mediation Act., 2004 Bill Text NJ S.B. 679; Uniform
Mediation Act., 2007 Bill Text NV S.B. 292.
17
Wolski, supra note 14, at 26.
18
LAW SOCIETY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, Professional Standards for Legal
Practitioners in Mediation (contained in the Law Society of New South Wales
Dispute Resolution Kit) (December 2012); LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA,
supra note 13.
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standards in Australia.
They aspire to influence
practitioners’ conduct by identifying best practices in
situations of uncertainty and provide guidelines for
professional bodies and courts to consider during
disciplinary proceedings.19
The analysis below will focus on the principal
obligations imposed by the Model Rules, Solicitors Rules,
and Barristers Rules. It will begin with a grand summary of
lawyers’ ethical obligations under the rules and significant
statutes in Australia and the United States.
There may be other rules or sections in these statutes
and ethical rules which also relate to truthfulness in
mediation but assessing each such obligation is not possible
in an article of this length.

19
Bobette Wolski, On Mediation, Legal Representatives and Advocates, 38(1)
UNI. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 5, 12 (2015) [hereinafter Wolski, On
Mediation].
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1a) Grand Summaries of Lawyers’ Obligations
AUSTRALIA
To whom
is the obligation
owed?
What is the nature of the obligation?
Mediator

1.

Paramount duty to the mediator and
administration of justice
Not deceive, or knowingly or recklessly
mislead, the mediator
Take all necessary steps to correct a
misleading statement
Not engage in conduct which is prejudicial to
the administration of justice or profession

1.

[Solicitors only] Not knowingly make a false
statement in relation to the case
[Barristers only] Not knowingly make a false
or misleading statement in relation to the case
Take all necessary steps to correct any
misleading statement made
o
[Barristers] No need to correct an
opponent’s error
o
[Solicitors] No need to correct an
opponent’s or other person’s error

5.
6.
7.

SR 22.1
BR 49
SRs 19.3, 22.2 and 22.3; BRs
50 and 51

8.

Participate in mediation in good faith

8.

Federal and state statutes such
as § 27 of NSW Civil
Procedure Act, and Court
Rules

9.

[Solicitors] Not make any statement which
grossly exceeds the legitimate assertion of
their client’s rights or entitlements AND also
misleads or intimidates the other person
[Solicitors] Not use tactics that go beyond
legitimate advocacy and are primarily
designed to embarrass or frustrate another
[Solicitors] Be honest and courteous in all
dealings

9.

SR 34.1.1 (also note § 18 of
ACL)
SR 34.1.3
SR 4.1.2
BR 4(c)
BR 8(a)
§ 18 of ACL
§ 4(1) of ACL

2.
3.
4.

Opposing lawyer

5.
6.
7.

Opposing lawyer
and opposing
client
Any person

What is the relevant rule or law?

10.
11.

2.
3.
4.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Solicitors Rule (SR) 3.1;
Barristers Rules (BR) 4 and
24
SR 19.1; BR 24
SR 19.2; BR 25
SR 5.1; BRs 4 and 23
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Client

16.
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[Barristers] Act honestly and fairly
[Barristers] Not engage in conduct which is
dishonest or otherwise discreditable
Not engage in conduct that is misleading or
deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive
Not make a representation about a future
matter that is not based on reasonable grounds
Act in client’s best interests (note the potential
of this obligation to conflict with the above)

16.

SR 4.1; BR 35

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
To whom is the
obligation owed?
Everyone except
the lawyer’s
client

What is the nature of the obligation?
1.

Not make a false statement of material fact or
law
Not fail to disclose a material fact when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by a client (unless
prohibited by MR 1.6)
Engage in an act or practice that is unfair and
deceptive

1.
2.
3.

Model Rule (MR) 4.1
MR 4.1
15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1)
(West 2006)

Not engage in conduct which is prejudicial to
the administration of justice
Demonstrate respect for the legal system
Seek improvement of the law, administration
of justice and the quality of service rendered
by the profession
Improve the law and the legal profession
Exemplify the profession's ideals of public
service

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

MR 8.4
MR Preamble [5]
MR Preamble [6]
MR Preamble [7]
MR Preamble [7]

9.

Participate in mediation in good faith

9.

Federal and state statutes,
such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 16,
and Court Rules

10.

Act in client’s best interests–such as by
providing competent representation and using
reasonable diligence and promptness (note the
potential to conflict with the above)

10.

MRs 1.1 to 1.4

2.

3.

Mediator

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Opposing
lawyer and
opposing client
Client

What is the relevant rule or law?

364

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss2/2

10

Angyal and Saady: Legal Lying?
[Vol. 21: 355, 2021]

Legal Lying?
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

1b) Obligations relating to truthfulness
i. Australia
Before examining the six types of Australian duties
relevant to truthfulness below, it is important to note that the
Australian Rules draw a distinction between duties owed to
the mediator and duties owed to opponents and others. In
other words, the duties depend on whom the lawyer is
addressing. This distinction will be evident in the analysis
of the rules below. Also, while it has been suggested by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales that
there is a single “duty of honesty owed to opponents,”20 as
the analysis below will show, it is more appropriate to state
that, in the context of a mediation, lawyers may owe
multiple obligations to their opponents which relate to
truthfulness.
First, the paramount and highest duty is owed to the
“court.” The court is defined in both the Solicitors and
Barristers Rules to include a mediation.21 The relevant
duties are therefore owed to the mediator as they would be
owed to the court in litigation.22 Rule 19.1 of the Solicitors
Rules states that “[a] solicitor must not deceive or knowingly
or recklessly mislead the court.”23
The principal
obligation—not to deceive the mediator—is unqualified.
Rule 19.2 adds to this by stating that a “solicitor must take

20

Bathurst, supra note 1, at ¶ 21.
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, Glossary of Terms (Austl.);
Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Cth) r. 125 (Austl.).
22
See generally Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015; Australian
Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015. The duty is owed to the mediator because a
lawyer cannot owe a duty to an abstract noun or a process and already owes
different duties to their opposing lawyer and opposing client. So, the only entity
to whom the lawyer could owe the relevant duty is the mediator. See Wolski,
supra note 14, at 31–32.
23
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.1 (Austl.)
21
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all necessary steps to correct a misleading statement.”24
There are equivalent obligations to the mediator in Rules 24
and 25 of the Barristers Rules.25
Because these duties of solicitors and barristers
apply to any statement made to the mediator, the other
persons present in mediation (namely, the opposing lawyer
and opposing client) also presumably receive the benefit of
the duties while the mediator is in the room. However,
perplexingly, this must mean that if the mediator leaves the
room, those remaining are only protected by the different,
less stringent rules outlined in this part of the article (i.e.
duties owed to the opposing lawyer, opposing client and
third parties). Such shifting ethical sands make it more
difficult for lawyers to manage their conduct during
mediation than when subject to the static ethical rules
applicable to litigation.
In the United States, the Model Rules do not contain
any similar differentiated obligations. They simply, through
Model Rule 4.1, impose a duty on a lawyer representing a
client at a mediation that is applicable to all persons except
the lawyer’s client.26
Second, Rule 22.1 of the Solicitors Rules provides
that “[a] solicitor must not knowingly make a false statement
to an opponent in relation to the case.”27 Rule 22.2 builds
on this, obliging solicitors to “take all necessary steps to
correct any false statement made . . . to an opponent as soon
as possible” after becoming aware of its falsity.28 Rule 22.3
further informs the obligations above, by providing that “[a]
solicitor will not have made a false statement to the
opponent simply by failing to correct” an opponent’s error.29
These provisions are mirrored by Rules 49 to 51 of the
24

Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.2 (Austl.).
Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 24–25 (Austl.).
26
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
27
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 22.1 (Austl).
28
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 22.2 (Austl.).
29
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 22.3 (Austl.).
25
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Barristers Rules–although Rule 49 extends to any false or
misleading statement, so it is broader than Solicitors Rule
22.1.30
It is noted that the Solicitors Rules contain the
unique Rule 19.3, which states that a solicitor will not
mislead by simply failing to correct an opponent’s or other
person’s error.31 This is broader than Rule 22.3 above and
Barristers Rule 51 because it applies to statements of “other
persons,” not just an opponent.
Third, there are more specific obligations dealing
with truthfulness to the mediator contained in Rules 19.4 to
19.12 of the Solicitors Rules.32 Similar provisions are
contained in 26 to 29 of the Barristers Rules; however, they
do not apply to mediation (they only apply to civil trials).33
Therefore, it is clear that lawyers have different obligations
in litigation than in mediation, despite contrary assertions.34
In any case, such specific obligations relating to truthfulness
to the mediator are not contained in the US Model Rules (as
above, because “tribunal” is not defined to include
mediation).35
Fourth, Rule 34.1.3 prevents solicitors from using
tactics that go beyond legitimate advocacy and are primarily
designed to embarrass or frustrate another person.36
Although cast in broad terms, this rule establishes some
restrictions on the tactics solicitors may employ in
mediation. There is no equivalent restriction on barristers’
tactics in Australia nor on lawyers’ tactics in the United
States.

30

Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 49–51 (Austl.).
Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.3 (Austl.).
32
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.4–19.12 (Austl.).
33
Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 26–29 (Austl.).
34
Bathurst, supra note 1, at 25.
35
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(m) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
36
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 34.1.3 (Austl.).
31
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Fifth, Rule 34.1.1 prohibits a solicitor from making
any statement which grossly exceeds the legitimate assertion
of their client’s rights or entitlements and which misleads or
intimidates another person.37
This is relevant to
overstatement and puffing and is largely directed at how
statements are phrased—ensuring advocates employ careful
language when speaking during mediation.
Unlike
Australian consumer-protection statutes, namely section 18
of the ACL, breach of Rule 34.1.1 requires the statement to
actually mislead the other person, rather than merely be
“likely to” mislead.38 As solicitors are subject to both the
Solicitors Rules and ACL, this distinction only relates to
liability—as a breach of the Solicitors Rules may lead to
professional misconduct findings, while breach of the ACL
may lead to civil liability. Nevertheless, it should be
acknowledged. Again, there is no equivalent restriction on
barristers’ tactics, nor on lawyers’ tactics in the United
States.
Sixth, there is a broad obligation in Rule 4.1.2 of the
Solicitors Rules that compels solicitors to be honest and
courteous in all dealings with their clients, other solicitors
and third parties.39 Rule 5(c) of the Barristers Rules
similarly requires barristers to act honestly and fairly.40
There is a more limited duty in Rule 8(a) of the Barristers
Rules which prevents barristers from engaging in conduct
which is dishonest or otherwise discreditable to barristers.41
These obligations may be argued to require some degree of
truthfulness during mediation—although they have yet to be
considered in that context. This is yet another example of
the difficulty that arises from the rules not specifically
dealing with the obligations of mediation advocates.
37

Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 34.1.1 (Austl.).
Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 18 (Austrl.); Australian Solicitors’
Conduct Rules 2015, r. 34.1.1 (Austl.).
39
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 4.1.2 (Austl.).
40
Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5(c) (Austl.).
41
Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 8(a) (Austl.).
38
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ii. The United States – Model Rule 4.1
Unlike the Australian rules, the Model Rules do not
impose separate obligations relating to the court and third
persons. Rather, they contain a single obligation which only
relates to third persons. A “third person” includes the
mediator of a dispute in which a lawyer is representing a
party.42 It also includes the lawyer’s opponent and the
opponent’s client, but it does not include a lawyer’s own
client,43 nor does it include a judge.44
Model Rule 4.1 provides that:
In the course of representing a client, a lawyer
must not knowingly:
a)
Make a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person; nor
b)
Fail to disclose a material fact to a
third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by a
client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6.45
The single obligation referred to above is contained
in Model Rule 4.1(a). The focus of this paper will be on
4.1(a) because it squarely deals with truthfulness. While
4.1(b) also deals with truthfulness, it is only applicable in
very limited circumstances (i.e. to avoid assisting a client’s
42

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Bolusky, 2001 OK 26, ¶ 18 n. 5, 23 P.3d 268,
275 n. 5 (citing MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Ch. 1, App. 3-A. (OKLA. BAR
ASS’N 1991)).
44
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 488, 495–97 n.
8 (Md. 1991) (citing MARYLAND LAWYERS’ RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
4.1(a)(2) (MD. STATE BAR ASS’N 1990)) (holding attorney Rohrback’s failure
to disclose the client’s use of a false name to the Commissioner overseeing the
criminal case fails to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard
requirement to find a Rule 4.1 violation).
45
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
43
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criminal or fraudulent act and where it is not trumped by
Rule 1.6). It is therefore less commonly invoked than 4.1(a)
and unlikely to arise in the context of mediation.
iii.

The United States – The History of Model
Rule 4.1(a)
The predecessor to Model Rule 4.1(a) was
contained in Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(5) of the ABA’s
1969 Model Code of Professional Conduct, which provided
that “[i]n his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . .
. knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.”46
Commenting on this rule, the reporter to the ABA’s
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
(which drafted the Model Rules) and eminent expert on legal
ethics,47 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., said:
This provision might be characterized as
a minimalist formulation of the law of
disclosure.
It
prohibits
only
misrepresentation and requires no
affirmative disclosure. It is limited to
statements of “fact” as distinguished
from evidence, indications, portents,
opinions,
possibilities,
or
even
probabilities of which the lawyer may be
aware. It is limited to matters that are
false as distinguished from those of
which the lawyer is skeptical or even
suspicious.48
46
MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. DR 7-102(A)(5) (1969) (AM. BAR ASS’N,
amended 1980).
47
Sam Roberts, Geoffrey Hazard, Influential Arbiter of Legal Ethics, Dies at
TIMES
(Jan.
18,
2018),
88,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/obituaries/geoffrey-hazard-influentialarbiter-of-legal-ethics-dies-at-88.html; A.L.I., In Memoriam, In Memoriam:
Geoffrey
C.
Hazard,
Jr.,
(Jan.
11,
2018),
https://www.ali.org/news/articles/memoriam-geoffrey-c-hazard-jr/.
48
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When
Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 189 (1981).
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In 1981, the ABA’s Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards proposed a final draft of its new
model ethical rules, which contained Model Rule 4.1(a).49
That rule provided that “[i]n the course of representing a
client a lawyer shall not: (a) Knowingly make a false
statement of fact or law to a third person.”50 In Hazard’s
view, the proposed final draft of Model Rule 4.1(a)
corresponded to the existing disciplinary rule (i.e. DR 7102(A)(5)).51
But this modest proposal did not survive. The rule
that emerged from the ABA’s 1983 Annual Meeting was
qualified by the term “material” (a term that was defined in
an early draft of the Model Rules but not in the final
version).52 The rule provided that “[i]n representing a client
a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person.”53 In relation to that
rule, the Commission commented that it was “substantially
similar” to DR 7-102(A)(5),54 despite the earlier rule being
49

Hazard, supra note 48, at 191.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Proposed Final
Draft
May
30,
1981),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_res
ponsibility/kutak_5-81.pdf.
51
Hazard, supra note 48, at 191.
52
It provided that “‘[m]aterial’ when used in reference to degree or extent
denotes a matter of practical importance as distinct from one that is formal or
nominal.” MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Terminology (AM. BAR ASS’N,
Proposed
Final
Draft
May
30,
1981),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_res
ponsibility/kutak_5-81.pdf.
53
L. STANLEY CHAUVIN, JR., AM. BAR ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT
401 TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT,
at
111
(July
11,
1983),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_res
ponsibility/kutak_8-83.pdf (emphasis added).
54
ROBERT J. KUTAK, AM. BAR ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT 400 TO
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, APPENDIX B, COMPARISON OF PROPOSED MODEL
RULES, AS REVISED, WITH PROVISIONS OF 1969 MODEL CODE OF
50
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unqualified by the word “material,” and the new rule being
qualified to an undefined extent, as the word “material” was
included but not defined.
iv. The United States – The Effect of Model
Rule 4.1(a)
Since its adoption, Model Rule 4.1(a) has created “a
floor below which lawyer-negotiators may not go.”55
However, there is a “wide chasm dividing expert opinion on
the applicable standard of truthfulness” under the Rule.56
The terms of Model Rule 4.1(a) prohibit a lawyer
from knowingly making false statements of material fact or
law.57
“Knowingly” is defined as denoting “actual
knowledge of the fact in question.”58 A person's knowledge
“may also be inferred from circumstances.”59 Neither
“material” nor “false” are defined in the rule. While the
meaning of false is quite straightforward, the meaning of
material is subject to great doubt and will be explored below.
Essentially, unlike the Australian rules, Model Rule
4.1(a) permits a U.S. lawyer representing a client at a
mediation to knowingly make false statements about nonmaterial facts. It also permits a U.S. lawyer to knowingly
make false statements about non-factual matters.
In other words, its effect is that small lies are legal,
while large lies are not. It is not clear whether the basis for
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY,
at
16
(June
30,
1982),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_res
ponsibility/kutak_8-82.pdf (comparing the revised proposed model rules with
provisions of the model code of professional responsibility from 1969).
55
Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450 (D. Md. 2002);
Alexsam, Inc. v. WildCard Sys., No. 15-CV61736-BLOOM/VALLE, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24347, at 26–29 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2019).
56
John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J.
1, 95 (1997).
57
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
58
See In re Tocco, 984 P.2d 539, 543 (Ariz. 1999) (quoting Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.
42); Brown v. Cnty. of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1989).
59
Tocco, 984 P.2d at 543.
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this position is that small lies are of no consequence, or
alternatively, that everyone expects negotiators to lie so the
ethical regulators’ focus should be on preventing large lies
that might affect the outcome of the mediation. But a series
of small but legal lies could have more impact than one big
illegal lie.
Further, whatever the basis of the Model Rule, its
impact and operation entirely depend on distinguishing
material facts from nonmaterial ones and factual statements
from nonfactual ones. As the below analysis shows, those
responsible for regulating lawyers’ truthfulness have not
been successful in drawing these distinctions.
v.
The
United
States
Distinguishing Statements for
Purposes of Model Rule 4.1(a)

–
the

i) Comment to Model Rule 4.1
A Comment accompanies Model Rule 4.1. Like all
Comments to the Model Rules, it is not binding. Its presence
acknowledges that the Rule’s scope is not immediately
obvious. Under the heading “Statements of Fact,” the
Comment relevantly provides that:
Whether a particular statement should be
regarded as one of fact can depend on the
circumstances. Under generally accepted
conventions in negotiation, certain types of
statements ordinarily are not taken as
statements of material fact. Estimates of
price or value placed on the subject of a
transaction and a party’s intentions as to an
acceptable settlement of a claim are
ordinarily in this category, and so is the
existence of an undisclosed principal
373
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except where nondisclosure of the
principal would constitute fraud.60
The Comment therefore establishes a circumstancedependent test for determining whether a statement is one of
fact. Presumably, the relevant “circumstances” mean the
circumstances in which the statement is made.
Despite starting off by providing guidance about
distinguishing between factual and non-factual statements,
confusingly, the Comment fails to deal with that distinction
and instead discusses the distinction between material and
nonmaterial facts. It does so by stating that the following are
“ordinarily” not “material fact[s]”: first, estimates of price or
value placed on the subject of a transaction—which
seemingly permits lies about all estimates or opinions of
value61— and second, a party’s intentions about the
acceptable settlement of a claim.
These two categories cover a variety of statements
which are often made in mediation, such as inflated or
deflated
offers,
counteroffers,
and
concessions;
representations regarding clients' settlement intentions; false
estimates of value concerning bargaining subjects; and lies
about target points.62
The breadth of these categories is problematic. For
example, one could interpret the first category to allow a
lawyer to lie to the mediator, the opponent, and the
opponent’s client about the value of a property or
transaction—even if that is the central issue in the
mediation—because such an estimate is not regarded as
material. However, if a statement’s materiality depends on
60

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
Don Peters, When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Truthfulness in Mediation and
a Modest Proposal, J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 129 (2007). By contrast, Australian
lawyers would likely regard such statements as containing all the elements of
the common law cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation: first, a false
statement; second, knowingly made; third, for the purposes of inducing the
representee to rely on the false statement and gaining a material advantage for
the representor.
62
Peters, supra note 61, at 129.
61
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the context in which it is made, and the central issue is that
property or transaction, one might think that such a statement
would be highly material.
As this example shows, regardless of the
importance of such information in the unique circumstances
of each mediation, these categories suggest that it is nonmaterial—therefore opening “a door for lawyers to lie when
negotiating.”63 These exceptions to materiality accept that
disingenuous behavior is indigenous to most legal
negotiations.
The Comment’s use of “ordinarily” suggests that
statements falling within these categories may, in some
circumstances, concern material facts. However, the
Comment fails to explain what circumstances make a
difference and why. It therefore exacerbates the confusion.
ii) Case Law Dealing with Model Rule
4.1
Several courts have grappled with the meaning of
Model Rule 4.1(a). The Federal District Court for the
District of Maryland has explained: “[w]hile the legal
journals engage in some hand-wringing about the vagueness
of this aspect of Rule 4.1, in reality, it seldom is a difficult
task to determine whether a fact is material to a particular
negotiation.64
In cases of real doubt, disciplinary
committees and ultimately the courts will decide.”65
Courts provide guidance for these “cases of real
doubt.” Courts have held that a fact is material if it
“reasonably may be viewed as important to a fair
understanding of what is being given up and, in return,

63
Peters, supra note 61, at 129 (quoting James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and
Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 255, 267 (1999)).
64
Ausherman v. Bank of America Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (D. Md.
2002).
65
Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
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gained by the settlement.”66
Similarly, courts have
concluded that a fact is material if it could or would influence
the hearer’s decision-making process.67 For example, it has
been held to be material for a lawyer to tell third parties to
comply with an invalid subpoena,68 and for a lawyer to
incorrectly tell the opposing birth father that the relevant
child would not be adopted without the birth father’s consent
during adoption proceedings.69 However, courts have
determined that it is not necessary to prove the statement
actually influenced the hearer under Model Rule 4.1.70
Courts have also suggested that the overriding consideration
when assessing the materiality of a fact is achieving
“justice;” this being “a fairly negotiated resolution based on
candor and integrity with respect to all material
representations.”71
In applying the above principles to determine the
materiality of a statement of fact or omission, the Federal
District Court for the District of Maryland proposed a fourstep approach. First, to identify the impugned statement of
fact or omission; second, determine if it is untrue or
deceptively incomplete in any significant respect; third,
determine, if reasonably viewed, it is important to the subject
being negotiated; and fourth, determine if the attorney knew
or should have known that the statement was untrue at the
time it was made.72
These decisions do little to assist in practice because
they are limited to their specific circumstances. They do not
assist a lawyer–negotiator in determining, in the heat of a
66

Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
See In re Merkel, 138 P.3d 847 (Or. 2006).
68
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Cocco, 109 A.3d 1176 (Md.
2015).
69
In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2016).
70
In re Winthrop, 848 N.E.2d 961 (Ill. 2006); In re Pizur, 84 N.E.3d 627 (Ind.
2017).
71
Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 449; U.S. v. Shaffer Equipment Company, 11
F.3d 450, 457-58 (4th Cir. 1993).
72
Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
67
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mediation, whether Model Rule 4.1(a) permits a false
statement.
iii) ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439
Apart from the Comment and case law, ABA’s
Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439 also deals with Model Rule
4.1(a)—which is a 2006, five-page formal opinion with
twenty-two footnotes.73 The Opinion intends to explain the
meaning of Model Rule 4.1. Again, the perceived need for
such a detailed document dealing with the meaning of a onesentence rule is an acknowledgement of the difficulty of
interpreting it.
The Opinion specifically addresses the lawyer’s
obligation to be truthful when making statements on behalf
of a client at a mediation.74 It repeats the Comment’s
circumstance-dependent test.75 But the Opinion otherwise
makes no reference to circumstances. Instead, it relies on
the proposition that statements departing from the truth by
exaggeration of strengths or deemphasis of weaknesses are
posturing or puffing—namely they “are statements upon
which parties to a negotiation ordinarily would not be
expected justifiably to rely, and must be distinguished from
false statements of material fact.”76 It therefore shifts the
focus from the circumstances in which the statement is made
to the likelihood of the recipient relying on it.
The Opinion does not explain why a party to whom
a false statement is made would not be expected to rely on
it, nor how to distinguish such false statements from ones on
which reliance will be placed.77 Nor does the Opinion
explain why a lawyer–negotiator would bother to make a

73

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
75
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
76
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
77
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
74
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statement which her or his opponent and client were not
expected to rely on.78
Additionally, the Opinion says that statements
about a party’s bottom line, a lawyer’s settlement authority,
and the death of a client are “material,” but that statements
about negotiating goals, willingness to compromise, or a
client’s bargaining position are not.79 It seems extremely
difficult to distinguish between these sets of statements—for
example, between statements about a party’s bottom line and
statements about its negotiating goals.
The Opinion also claims that Comment C to section
98 of The Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing
Lawyers “echoes the principles underlying Comment [2] to
Rule 4.1.”80
However, the Opinion then misquotes
Comment C to the Restatement, leaving the reader with no
coherent statement of principle.81
Considering all of the above, the Opinion leaves the
reader no wiser about the meaning of Rule 4.1(a).
iv) The Restatement (Third) of The Law
Governing Lawyers
Model Rule 4.1(a) is also dealt with by the
Restatement.82 Section 98 of the Restatement and the
comments attached to it provide a test for determining
whether Rule 4.1(a) prohibits a lawyer from making a
statement that is false.83 But the test appears completely
unworkable in practice, for reasons explained below.
According to Comment C, whether a statement
should be characterized as a false statement of fact or law

78

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
80
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
81
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
82
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law
Inst. 2000).
83
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law
Inst. 2000).
79
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depends on whether it is “reasonably apparent”84 that the
listener-to-be would regard the statement as one of three
possible alternatives: (1) one of fact, (2) based on the
speaker's knowledge of facts reasonably implied by the
statement, or (3) merely an expression of the speaker's state
of mind.85
While the Comment does not make this explicit, it
seems clear that the first two types of statements are
statements of fact, and the third type is not a statement of
fact. The Comment thus suggests that the first two types
might (if they are false and about something “material”) be
forbidden by Model Rule 4.1(a) while the third type seems
to be the only permissible form of false statement.
The Restatement says that assessing which type of
statement is involved requires the speaker-to-be (i.e., the
lawyer) to weigh “the circumstances in which the statement
is made”—particularly seven factors—before making the
statement.86 These factors are:
1.
The past relationship of the negotiating
persons;
2.
Their apparent sophistication;
3.
The plausibility of the statement on its face;
4.
The phrasing of the statement;
5.
Related communication between the persons
involved;
6.
The known negotiating practices of the
community in which both are negotiating;
and

84

Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law
Inst. 2000).
85
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law
Inst. 2000).
86
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law
Inst. 2000).
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7.
Similar circumstances.87
Neither the meaning nor the relevance of these
factors is explained, and some are obscure. For example,
what are “similar circumstances”? Whatever they are, do
they tend to make the statement more or less likely to be
perceived as a statement of fact? The latter question also
arises in relation to the “sophistication” of the listener-to-be.
These are serious problems. But what makes the
test propounded by Comment C unworkable in practice is
that, before making a false statement in the heat of
negotiations, the speaker-to-be must rapidly use what
Australian courts call a “multi-factorial approach” to
determine whether the recipient-to-be of the statement is
likely to treat it as a statement of fact (in which case the
speaker-to-be must be truthful if it is a “material” fact) or not
(in which case the speaker-to-be is free to lie). 88
The task imposed by the Comment C test is even
more burdensome than it first appears. For example, it is
common to have twenty people in a mediation room during
construction disputes in which defendants have
counterclaimed, which joins other parties and their legal
representatives. The test set out in Comment C would
require a lawyer for a party to perform the multi–factorial
analysis in relation to every person present before making a
statement—because the statement is not permitted unless it
falls into the third category with respect to every person
present.
Given these problems, the explanation in section 98
of the Restatement of how Model Rule 4.1(a) is to be applied
adds further confusion to an already confusing topic.
87

Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law
Inst. 2000).
88
See, e.g., Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd. v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616 [100]
(Allsop P), [174] (Basten JA), [241] (Simpson J) (Austl.) (using a multifactorial analysis to determine whether a refinery that employed Mr. Stavar to
lag pipes with asbestos owed a novel duty of care to his wife, who developed
malignant mesothelioma from washing his work clothes laden with asbestos).
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Even if the Restatement test were workable, the
writers ask the obvious question: if the speaker-to-be is free
to lie only when it is reasonably apparent that the recipientto-be will not treat their statement seriously, regarding it as
hyperbole or a reflection of the speaker’s state of mind, why
bother?89 In particular, why take the risk of breaching Model
Rule 4.1(a) by inadvertently telling a lie about a material
fact, given that the best outcome for the lawyer is using their
freedom to lie to a person who will not take the lie seriously?
The writers suggest that it would take much less effort, and
certainly be less risky, to tell the truth.
The writers also suggest that the Restatement test
negatively impacts the value and integrity of mediation as a
dispute resolution process. Its practical effect is that a
prudent listener who is aware of the test is likely to assume
that everything they are told by the opposing lawyer is a lie.
This is not only detrimental to lawyers’ reputations, but it
also makes mediation—a structured negotiation—much less
efficient than if everyone present could assume that they
were being told the truth.
The writers suggest that further attempts by the
ABA or the Restatement to delineate the circumstances in
which lawyers can make false statements during
negotiations would be futile. This is because the exercise is
inherently self-contradictory. False statements are justified
by saying that they “are statements upon which parties to a
negotiation ordinarily would not be expected justifiably to
rely”90 and by saying that “[u]nder generally accepted
conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.”91
Thus, the making of false statements is justified by asserting
89

Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law
Inst. 2000).
90
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
91
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
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that the recipient of the statements will not be harmed by
them because they will not rely on them and/or will not
regard them as communicating factual material.
The obvious problem with this defense of false
statements is that, if they are trivialized to this extent, there is
little if any point in making them. But, to the extent that more
substantive false statements are permitted, the damage caused
by them will increase and the ABA’s position will be seen to
be morally wrong.
In short, there is an inescapable dilemma resulting
from allowing some false statements: The more trivial the
permitted false statements are, the less point there is in
making them. And the more substantive the permitted false
statements are, the greater the damage they will cause to the
recipients and to the moral authority of U.S. lawyers.
This explains why neither Model Rule 4.1(a) nor the
relevant commentary brighten the line between what is
impermissible lying and permissible puffing or posturing
and why.92 There is only one escape from the dilemma: the
simple stratagem of prohibiting false statements by lawyers.
Further, any possible advantage accruing to a
lawyer from the ability to tell lies during a mediation can
easily be nullified by a well-advised opponent who says to
them, preferably in writing, before the start of the mediation
something to the following effect:
First, I understand that Model Rule 4.1(a) permits
you to lie during our negotiations about nonmaterial facts. We are putting you on notice that,
throughout our negotiations, we will assume that all
statements you make to us concern material facts
and, therefore, that you are obliged to be truthful in
making them. Second, if you wish to make any
statements of non-material facts, we require you to
state in advance that you are about to do this, and
92

JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY 150 (National Institute for Trial
Advocacy ed., 1st ed. 1996) [hereinafter COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY].
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we are informing you now that we will not believe
those statements because you are permitted to lie
when making them. Third, if you disagree with
these rules of engagement, please let us know
before we start negotiating. In the absence of any
articulated disagreement, we will assume that you
have agreed to be bound by these rules. If you are
not prepared to agree to these rules of engagement,
we will assume that you are lying throughout the
mediation and will not believe anything you say.
vi.)

Further Comparative Analysis Of The
Australian Rules And Model Rule 4.1(a)
First, both sets of rules use a largely subjective
frame of analysis—focusing on knowing conduct (although
knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances). The
terms of the relevant rules focus on the state of mind of the
relevant lawyer (except for the suggestion in The
Restatement to focus on the recipient’s mind).93 For
example, the rules therefore do not prohibit innocent
misrepresentation or the making of a false or misleading
statement which the lawyer did not know to be such at the
time of making nor after it.94
This frame of analysis can be quite problematic in
determining any breach of the relevant rules, because it
allows lawyers to plead their lack of knowledge prior to
making any false or misleading statements, and it forces
93

E.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am.
Law Inst. 2000) (“Whether a misstatement should be so characterized depends
on whether it is reasonably apparent that the person to whom the statement is
addressed would regard the statement as one of fact or based on the speaker's
knowledge of facts reasonably implied by the statement or as merely an
expression of the speaker's state of mind.”).
94
See, e.g., Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 24 (Austl.) (stating
when misrepresentation or a misleading statement is made to the mediator, the
obligation not to deceive is absolute).
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prosecuting authorities to produce objective evidence to
prove the impugned lawyer’s knowledge. This may also
encourage lawyer negligence, as lawyers may be encouraged
to refrain from undertaking due diligence (that a reasonable
lawyer in their position would have taken) to confirm the
truthfulness of a statement they make in mediation.
However, extending the rule to negligent falsity or
misleading statements would appear to significantly broaden
the reach of the rule, precipitate disciplinary litigation and
complicate the relevant tribunals’ and courts’ inquiries in
such litigation. So, the current approach would seem to
strike an appropriate balance between these two competing
interests.
Second, an issue, which is not squarely addressed in
Model Rule 4.1 or the relevant Australian rules, is whether
lawyers are obliged to correct false or misleading statements
made by their clients during mediation, or by mediators. In
relation to their client, given that the lawyer is essentially a
unified party with their client, it would appear that the
relevant rules require correction under Solicitors Rules 19.2
and 22.2, and Model Rule 4.1.95 Otherwise, it would allow
a lawyer to instruct their client to disseminate false or
misleading statements with impunity under the ethical rules.
But, for Australian solicitors, this interpretation is
complicated by Solicitors Rule 19.3 which provides that a
solicitor will not make a misleading statement to a mediator
simply by failing to correct an error in a statement by “any
other person”—including the lawyer’s client.96 While this
seemingly leaves it open for a solicitor to make such an
instruction to their client, other obligations, such as in
section 18 of the ACL, are likely to prevent the relevant
solicitor from doing so.97
95

Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.2, 22.2 (Austl.); MODEL
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
96
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.3 (Austl.).
97
Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 18 (Austrl.).
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The situation is a little different for the mediator. In
Australia, Solicitors Rule 19.2 would apply to require the
lawyer to “take all necessary steps” to correct a misleading
statement made by the lawyer to the mediator after becoming
aware of its misleading nature.98 There is no equivalent rule
in the United States, so a lawyer who unknowingly made a
false statement of material fact to the mediator has no
obligation to correct the statement after finding out that it
was false. As a result, the mediator could continue to
conduct the mediation on the basis of the false statement.
This is obviously problematic.
Third, it is clear from above that the Australian
obligations are more comprehensive than their U.S.
equivalents.
The Australian obligations relating to
truthfulness are not limited to material facts—providing a
broader obligation by covering all types of facts. They also
extend to expressly prohibiting deception and reckless
misleading of the mediator—again holding lawyers to a
higher standard of truthfulness.
While there are other textual differences between
the jurisdictions’ rules, there is likely to be little difference
in their practical application. For example, while the
Australian obligations clarify that failure to correct an
opponent or other person in mediation is not misleading
conduct and the Model Rules are silent on this issue, the lack
of express provisions preventing such silence suggests that
it would be allowed in the United States. Additionally, a
Solicitors Rule 34.1.1 statement which grossly exceeds the
legitimate assertion of a client’s rights and which misleads
the other person may be considered to also be a false
material statement to a third person under Model Rule 4.1.99

98

Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.2 (Austl.).
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 34.1.1 (Austl.); MODEL RULES
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).

99
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So, there may be some overlap, despite the Model Rules not
being couched in the same terms, nor as comprehensively.
However, as explained below, the practical
application and understanding of these sets of rules in
Australia and the United States fundamentally differ. While
the Law Council of Australia guidelines do not prohibit
puffing, in the commentary to section 6.2, the Guidelines
warn lawyers to “never mislead and be careful of puffing”.100
Similarly, the Solicitors Rules limit the extent and topics of
puffing or overstatement by providing in Rule 34.1.1 that
lawyers cannot make a statement which “grossly exceeds the
legitimate assertion” of their client’s rights or
entitlements.101 Despite being conducive to a limited scope
of puffing, these regulations appear hostile to lying and
active misleading. So, while “some puffing, overstatement
and deception are normal in negotiation”,102 there is
uncertainty about how far a lawyer can go in doing so.103
Unsurprisingly, it appears that lawyers take advantage of this
uncertainty, as it has been stated that in Australia there
remains “anecdotal evidence that many lawyers lie routinely
in their negotiation practice.”104 Lankhani has even
suggested that lying and deception are inherent to mediation,
being an instinctive human behavior.105
The U.S. position treats puffing as acceptable
mediation practice and goes much further than the Australian
position by accepting lying and active misleading as
legitimate tactics. U.S. scholar Cooley has suggested that
100

LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 13, at r. 6.2(a).
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 34.1.1 (Austl.).
102
BOBETTE WOLSKI ET AL., SKILLS, ETHICS, AND VALUES FOR LEGAL
PRACTICE 530 (Lawbook Co. ed., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter WOLSKI ET AL.,
SKILLS, ETHICS, AND VALUES].
103
SAMANTHA HARDY & OLIVIA RUNDLE, MEDIATION FOR LAWYERS 221
(CCH Australia Ltd. ed., 2010).
104
HARDY & RUNDLE, supra note 103, at 221.
105
Avnita Lakhani, The Truth about Lying as a Negotiation Tactic: Where
Business, Ethics, and Law Collide … or Do They?: Part 2, 9 ADR BULL. 133
(2007).
101
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under the ethical rules “lawyers may not lie for clients . . .
when to do so would be civilly actionable”.106 This
commentary reflects the common position in the United
States that Model Rule 4.1 goes little further (if at all) than
the applicable statutory and common law (such as relating to
fraud and misrepresentation), in contrast to the Australian
rules which seem to hold lawyers to a higher standard of
truthfulness than the generally applicable Australian
statutory and common law.
Reflecting this common position, the ABA’s
Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439 explains that it is not unusual
in a negotiation for a party, directly or through counsel, to
make a statement about its position that is less than entirely
forthcoming, and to exaggerate the strength of its factual or
legal position.107 Burns concluded that it is permissible
under the Model Rules to actively mislead an opponent as to
one’s bottom line and use false statements of immaterial
facts.108 Albeit writing in 1980, White similarly explained
that the “critical difference between those who are successful
negotiators and those who are not lies in this capacity both
to mislead and not to be misled” and that “a careful
examination of the behavior of even the most forthright,
honest, and trustworthy negotiators will show them actively
106

COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY, supra note 92, at 42.
See Resolution Systems Institute, Formal Opinion 06-439: Lawyer's
Obligation of Truthfulness When Representing a Client in Negotiation:
Application
to
Caucused
Mediation,
Institute,
https://www.aboutrsi.org/library/formal-opinion-06-439-lawyers-obligationof-truthfulness-when-representing-a-client-in-negotiation-application-tocaucused-mediation (“ABA Formal Opinion 06-439 discusses ‘the obligation
of a lawyer to be truthful when making statements on behalf of clients in
negotiations, including the specialized form of negotiation known as caucused
mediation.’ The opinion allows for ‘posturing’ or ‘puffing’ by parties to the
negotiation. This includes understating their willingness to make concessions
and exaggerating their strengths. These are not considered false statements of
material fact under Model Rule 3.3 or 4.1.”)
108
Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 691, 694 (2001–2002).
107
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engaged in misleading their opponents.”109 He even goes on
to state that misleading “is the essence of negotiation.”110
Prominent scholar Menkel-Meadow posited that
oppositional presentation in mediation inevitably leads to
distortion of the truth by encouraging parties to make
extreme claims, avoid any potentially harmful facts, and
manipulate information.111 Riley took this further by stating
that lying is “not the province of a few ‘unethical lawyers’
who operate on the margins of the profession. It is a
permanent feature of advocacy and thus of almost the entire
province of law.”112 Analogously, Wetlaufer stated that
“lying can be highly effective” as it “offers significant
distributive advantages to the liar,” describing it as a
“coherent and often effective strategy” which if never used
“may place a negotiator at a systematic and sometimes
overwhelming disadvantage.”113 He even posited that “any
number of lies, including those involving reservation prices
and opinions that are both useful and virtually
undiscoverable.”114
Abramson
asserts
the
most
interesting
proposition.115 He seems to regard the use of “tricks”—
including lying about material facts, arriving at mediation
without sufficient settlement authority, and misleading
through intentional ambiguity—as a choice open to U.S.
lawyers in fashioning an effective negotiation style for
109
James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 926, 927 (1980).
110
White, supra note 109, at 928.
111
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 21–22 (1996).
112
Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of
Defensive Self-Help, 24 OHIO STATE. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 481, 483–484 (2008).
113
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV.
1219, 1230 (1990).
114
Wetlaufer, supra note 113, at 1230.
115
Hal Abramson, Fashioning an Effective Negotiation Style: Choosing
Between Good Practices, Tactics, and Tricks, 23 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 319
(2018).
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themselves at mediation.116 Such a position appears to
conflict with some of the Model Rules identified above, and
starkly contrasts with the Australian Rules and the
Australian commentators’ views set out above.
An analysis of relevant case law further illustrates
the gulf between Australia and the United States. Three
leading cases in Australia are Legal Services Commissioner
v Mullins,117 Legal Services Commissioner v Garrett,118 and
Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Fleming.119
Mullins and Garrett were two cases involving a mediation
where Mullins and Garrett, as legal representatives
(respectively, as a barrister and solicitor), represented a
client rendered paraplegic in an automobile accident.120
Before the mediation, they gave the driver of the other car’s
insurer detailed schedules of damages based on the normal
life expectancy of a paraplegic of their client’s age.121
However, the day before the mediation, their client revealed
that he had just been diagnosed with advanced cancer.122
Their client also instructed them not to reveal this diagnosis
unless the law required them to.123 At the mediation, Mullins
and Garrett continued to rely on the schedules of damages
served earlier, therefore in effect representing that they were
not aware of any material change in their client’s life
expectancy.124 Both parties faced disciplinary action, where
116

Abramson, supra note 115, at 327–29.
[2006] LPT 012,
https://applications.lsc.qld.gov.au/document/download/10784.
118
[2009] LPT 12.
119
[2006] WASAT 352. See Campbell Bridge SC, Effective and Ethical
Negotiations,
NSW
Bar
Assoc.,
https://nswbar.asn.au/docs/professional/prof_dev/BPC/course_files/Effective_
and_Ethical_Settlement_Negotiations_-_Bridge_SC_updated_2016.pdf.
120
Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶2.
121
Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶1–6.
122
Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶9.
123
Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶10.
124
Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶12–15.
117
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Mullins was held to have committed “intentional deception”
and “fraudulent deception” under the Queensland State
Barristers Rules 51 and 52 (almost identical to Solicitors
Rules 22.1 and 22.2), and Garrett was held similarly
responsible under the relevant Queensland state solicitors
rules.125 Fleming was a solicitor acting for an estate who
was held to have breached Rule 3.1 of the Western
Australian State Professional Conduct Rules by attempting
to further his client's case by unfair or dishonest means—
after representing that the a will was enforceable when in
fact it was an informal will (unenforceable without a court
order regularizing it)—despite this course of action
according with his client’s instructions.126 The Tribunal
suggested that honesty, fairness and integrity were even
more important in negotiations between practitioners than in
court because:
they are conducted outside the Court and
are beyond the control which a judge
hearing the matter might otherwise
exercise over the practitioners involved.
Outside the trial process, there is no
impartial adjudicator to ‘find the truth’
between the opposing assertions . . . A level
of trust between the advisers involved is
therefore essential.127
Three U.S. examples paint a very different picture.
The first case, Otto v. Hearst Communications,128 involved
the settlement conference of a copyright claim relating to a
photo taken of President Trump at a wedding in 2017. At
the conference, the plaintiff’s lawyers allegedly violated
their ethical obligations by producing misleading documents
about the licensing of the photo and by giving misleading
125

Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶30–31.
Bridge, supra note 119, at ¶23–24.
127
[2006] WASAT 352 [76].
128
No. 17-CV-4712 (GHW) (JLC), U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35051 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 21,
2019).
126
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answers to questions about their client’s settlement of related
claims to allegedly inflate the settlement amount.129
However, in contrast to the results of Mullins and Fleming,
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New
York refused to impose sanctions on the relevant lawyers,
finding on the evidence presented that their conduct
amounted to posturing and did not constitute
misrepresentation nor acting in bad faith.130 Interestingly,
the court held that while advocates “may not lie to opposing
counsel about a fact that is material to the resolution of the
case . . . recognizing where the line is to be drawn between
ethical and unethical behavior during the negotiation process
can be difficult to discern.”131 The court then “strongly”
cautioned the plaintiff’s lawyers “to be mindful of
overplaying their hands (or worse) during settlement
negotiations.” 132
Second, in Alexsam Incorporated v. WildCard
Systems Incorporated133 the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that an attorney did not
breach Model Rule 4.1, nor act in bad faith, by failing to
disclose to the other party at mediation that his client had
filed a separate complaint in state court that was unknown to
that other party at the time of the mediation. This is similar
to the lawyers’ silence about their client’s life expectancy in
Mullins. However, the federal district court reached a
completely different result by not finding a breach of the
ethical rules.134

129

Otto, LEXIS 35051 at *12.
Bridge, supra note 119, at ¶23–24; Otto, LEXIS 35051 at *23.
131
Otto, LEXIS 35051 at *25, (quoting Ausherman v. Bank of America Corp.,
212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 443–444, 446 (D. Md. 2002)).
132
Otto, LEXIS 35051 at *36.
133
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24347 (S.D.Fla. 2019).
134
Alexsam, Inc. v. WildCard Sys., Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24347, at 28–
29 (2019).
130
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Third, in a hypothetical Pennsylvanian case similar
to Mullins and Fleming, a client knew and told their lawyer
that they only had one year to live because of a non-work
related illness but sought to accept an offer for payment of
an amount equivalent to three years of workers’
compensation.135 In an ethics opinion, the Pennsylvania Bar
Association’s Committee on Ethics determined that the
lawyer did not need to disclose this, mainly because Model
Rule 4.1 was not engaged as no representation had been
made to the opposing side and the information provided by
the client was protected by confidentiality.136 This contrasts
with the results in the Australian cases above. 137
Some U.S. cases, however, have reached similar
conclusions to the Australian cases.138 For example, a
district court held a lawyer to have breached Model Rule 4.1
by serving and relying on an expert’s damages report that he
knew was misleading.139 In In Re Rosen, a lawyer breached
Model Rule 4.1 by making misrepresentations which led an
insurance company to believe his deceased client was still
alive.140 In another case, an attorney was suspended for
breaching the predecessor to Model Rule 4.1 by failing to
disclose the existence of a $1 million umbrella policy while
negotiating the reduction of a hospital’s lien against the
proceeds of personal injury recovery by his plaintiff
client.141
These cases illustrate that findings differ depending
on the circumstances in which a statement is made, and the
135
Pa. Bar. Ass’n. Comm. on Legal Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 2001-26
(April 26, 2001).
136
Pa. Bar. Ass’n. Comm. on Legal Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 2001-26
(April 26, 2001).
137
Pa. Bar. Ass’n. Comm. on Legal Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 2001-26
(April 26, 2001).
138
In re Rosen, 198 P.3d 116, 121 (Colo. 2008); see Nebraska State Bar
Association v. Addison, 412 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Neb. 1987).
139
In re Filosa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 460, 465–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
140
Rosen, 198 P.3d at 121.
141
Nebraska State Bar Association, 412 N.W.2d at 856.
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perception of the relevant adjudicative body. They also
illustrate the contrasting perceptions of Australian and U.S.
adjudicative bodies about what constitutes misconduct for
making false or misleading statements, or for remaining
silent where such silence would be misleading. The judicial
perceptions are largely reflected in the relevant academic
commentary set out above.
The U.S. judicial and academic acceptance of lying
and active misleading in mediation and negotiation is not a
feature of Australian jurisprudence.142
Australian
academics recognize that various deceptive tactics, such as
settlement point deception and puffing, are legitimate and
often necessary in mediation but fall short of condoning
tactics such as lying.143 Most Australian attorneys do not
consider lying a legitimate form of advocacy largely because
of Rules reviewed in this article, the precedent set by the
cases above, and the operation of consumer protection
statutes such as the ACL which are likely to prohibit
lying.144
The Australian approach is more appropriate
largely because it maintains the integrity of the process of
mediation and the reputation of the legal profession involved
in mediation policies which will be explained further below
in Part Two. Although some commentators have argued that
lawyers should be obliged to be candid at mediations and
fully disclose every matter within their knowledge (in terms
of “maintaining ‘total candor,’”145 “forbidding all

142
Wolski, supra note 14. See also Bobette Wolski, The Truth About Honesty
and Candour in Mediation: What the Tribunal Left Unsaid in the Mullins Case,
36 MELB. U. L. REV. 706, 714 (2012) [hereinafter Wolski, The Truth].
143
Wolski, The Truth, supra note 142, at 717.
144
Abbe Smith, Defending the Unpopular Down-Under, 30 MELB. U. L. REV.
495, 537–538 (2006).
145
Cooley, supra note 56, at 96 (quoting Waiter W. Steele, Deceptive
Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1403 (1986)).
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deception,”146 and “minimizing ‘an unreasonable risk of
harm’”),147 the writers do not agree with such propositions
because they consider them to be unrealistic, rid mediation
of its adversarial nature, and go beyond the requirements set
by the relevant regulations.148 They would also likely be
against lawyers’ duties to serve their clients’ interests and
provide the opposing party with comparative advantage.
Rather, the writers’ view is simply that lawyers
should be obliged to be truthful when representing a client
at mediation. While some amendments to the regulations of
truthfulness may be necessary (see Part Two), lawyers
should simultaneously focus on becoming more cognizant
of the ethical boundaries set by the relevant regulations in
respect to truth and behave accordingly. There will be
outliers who still take advantage of the blurry line between
when a lawyer must tell the truth and when they can lie. But
one can hope that lawyers will take heed of their expected
conduct and roles as administrators of justice and err on the
side of caution in relation to these boundaries.
From a practical perspective, the Australian
approach to lying and active misleading as negotiation
tactics better serves the interests of lawyers themselves.
Especially in smaller or specialized legal communities,
lawyers quickly develop a reputation based on previous
negotiation behavior.149 Such a reputation is particularly
important to lawyers’ practice and how they are perceived
by their peers.150 Toeing the line of truth in mediation is
likely to detrimentally affect the image of the lawyers and
participants involved.
A speaker’s overstatement,
146
Cooley, supra note 56, at 96 (citing See Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies
in Negotiation, 48 OHIO STATE L.J. 1, 50 (1987))
147
Cooley, supra note 56, at 96 (quoting Rex R. Perschbacher, Regulating
Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 133-34 (1985)).
148
HOWARD RAIFFA, LECTURES ON NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 11 (PON Books,
1996); see also Reed E. Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous
Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45 (1994).
149
Reilly, supra note 57, at 526.
150
HARDY & RUNDLE, supra note 49, at 224.
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embellishment, or exaggeration of the truth usually inspires
listeners to be apprehensive and cautious about accepting the
speaker’s message.151 If a speaker misrepresents an
important fact, even innocently, listeners may lose
confidence in the speaker’s ability to be truthful, may refuse
to communicate with the speaker, or may become
vindictive.152 Peters states, “[e]ffective lawyers know that
they do not need to lie to negotiate effectively,” referencing
a connection in the relevant research between honest
negotiating and perceived effectiveness.153
Considering one of Aristotle’s three artistic means
of persuasion, “pathos” (i.e., emotions aroused in a
speaker’s audience), a speaker’s character is judged
according to their personal qualities and the stereotypes,
which relate to them.154 Lawyers should be constantly
aware of the cultural impact untrustworthiness has on their
ability to persuade their audience and, therefore, to
effectively represent their clients. As Cooley explains,
mediation advocates “need to have an intimate
understanding of the affective component of persuasion,
pathos.”155 While a lawyer might get away with lying once
or twice, in the long term, their reputation is likely to precede
them and result in utter distrust of everything said unless it
can be independently verified. That is scarcely conducive to
effective and efficient negotiations or to the development
and maintenance of a thriving legal practice. As the Court
perfectly encapsulated in Otto, “[l]awyers have one
treasured possession above all else, and that is their
reputation . . . [i]f it is squandered and lawyers become
known for being untrustworthy, both their clients and the
151

COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY, supra note 92, at 93.
COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY, supra note 92, at 93.
153
Peters, supra note 61, at 141.
154
COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY, supra note 92, at 124–25.
155
COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY, supra note 92, at 125.
152
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Court are ill–served,”156 and their legal practices often are
irreversibly damaged.
1c) Obligations to the courts, justice, and
profession
Broad, overarching duties to the relevant court
system, administration of justice, and the legal profession
are imposed on lawyers in both jurisdictions.157
i)
Australia
Rule 3.1 of the Solicitors Rules provides that a
“solicitor’s duty to the court and the administration of justice
is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with
any other duty.”158 As discussed above, “court” is defined
as including a mediation.159 There is an additional
obligation under Rule 5.1, which prohibits solicitors from
engaging in conduct, in the course of practice or otherwise,
which is likely to a material degree to “be prejudicial to . . .
the administration of justice; or bring the profession into
disrepute.”160 This is an extremely broad obligation, which
applies beyond the course of a lawyer’s practice because of
the word “otherwise” in Rule 5.1.161
Similarly, Rule 4 of the Barristers Rules provides
that “barristers owe their paramount duty to the
administration of justice,” “owe duties to the courts, to their
clients and to their barrister and solicitor colleagues,” and
“must maintain high standards of professional conduct.”162
This is supplemented by Rule 23, which states that barristers
owe “an overriding duty to the court to act with
156

Otto, LEXIS 35051 at *36.
See, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian
Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Austl.); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT
(AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
158
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 3.1 (Austl.).
159
See generally Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Austl.).
160
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.).
161
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.).
162
Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 4 (Austl.).
157
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independence in the interests of the administration of
justice.”163 Again, “court” is defined as including a
mediation. 164
Because both the Solicitors and Barristers Rules
render the duty to the administration of justice paramount
over any inconsistent duty, an Australian lawyer cannot take
refuge in their duties to their client or their duty to maintain
confidentiality.165 Further, as stated above, it seems that
such paramount duties are only binding while the mediator
is present, with the different and less stringent duties
outlined above (i.e., duties owed to the opposing lawyer,
opposing client, and third parties) applying to the remaining
parties after the mediator leaves the room.166
ii)
The United States
There is no equivalent paramount or overarching
duty in the Model Rules.167 The Preamble to the Model
Rules uses broad language to reiterate the duties of lawyers
to: demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those
who serve it (in paragraph 5); seek improvement of the law,
administration of justice, and the quality of service rendered
by the legal profession (in paragraph 6); improve the law and
the legal profession (in paragraph 7); and exemplify the legal
profession's ideals of public service (in paragraph 7).168 The
other relevant rule is Model Rule 8.4, which defines
professional misconduct as engaging in “conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice” in 8.4(d).169
163

Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 23 (Austl.).
See generally Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Austl.).
165
See, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian
Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Austl.).
166
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian
Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Austl.).
167
See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
168
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
169
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
164
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However, there is no separate, paramount obligation relating
to the administration of justice akin to those in the Australian
rules.170
It should also be noted that common law duties
developed through case law also impose certain obligations
on lawyers to the relevant courts and administration of
justice in both the USA and Australia, but a detailed analysis
of case law establishing these obligations is beyond the
scope of this article.
iii) Further Comparative Analysis
In Australia and the USA there is no specific
guidance which suggests that the above duties compel
lawyers to make truthful statements at all times during
mediation.171 There are also no cases directly dealing with
the point.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that in both
jurisdictions, the above duties are broad enough to cover
conduct during mediation, including the truthfulness of
lawyers’ advocacy.172 This is because mediation is a process
involving the administration of justice and one which affects
the public perception of participating lawyers and their
profession.173 This is especially so for court-mandated
mediation because the process of mediation is associated

170
See, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian
Barristers’ Conduct Rules (Austl.).
171
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983); Australian
Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian Barristers’ Conduct
Rules 2015 (Austl.).
172
See, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian
Barristers’ Conduct Rules (Austl.); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM.
BAR ASS'N 1983).
173
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.4 cmt 5, r.1.12 (AM. BAR ASS'N
1983).
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with the court. 174 In reality, most mediations are conducted
in the “shadow” of the courthouse.175
For example, allowing a lawyer to lie during
mediation would seem inconsistent with the proper
administration of justice. Similarly, permitting lawyers to
lie during mediation would seem averse to the integrity of
the legal profession. However, without clarification from
rule makers or judges, the impact of these duties on
truthfulness in mediation cannot be definitively stated.
Again, this highlights the need for further guidance about
how such general rules apply to mediation, or for the
enactment of similar rules tailored to mediation.
1d) Obligations of good faith in mediation
Regulatory schemes in both Australia and the
United States impose “good faith” obligations on lawyers
during mediation which “dance along the periphery” of
truthfulness in mediation.176 They are described below.
It is important to note that mediation agreements
also often contain good faith terms.177 For example, the Law
Society of New South Wales’ Model Mediation Clause
contains a subclause 3.5.2 which provides that the parties
must mediate “with a genuine commitment to
participate.”178 Similarly, in New York, the Center for
174

LAURENCE BOULLE, MEDIATION - PRINCIPLES PROCESS PRACTICE 143 (3d
ed. 2005).
175
LAURENCE BOULLE, MEDIATION - PRINCIPLES PROCESS PRACTICE 143 (3d
ed. 2005).
176
James K. L. Lawrence, Misrepresenting, Puffing and Bluffing: Legal,
Ethical and Professional Standards for Negotiators and Mediation Advocates,
29 OHIO STATE. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 35, 55 (2014).
177
Jon Lang, Good faith in mediation – pillar or platitude? Mediation in
Practice (June 2019), https://jonlang.com/good-faith-in-mediation-pillar-orplatitude/.
178
LAW
SOCIETY
OF
NEW
SOUTH
WALES,
https://www.lawsociety.com.au/sites/default/files/201803/Model%20Clause.pdf, (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
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Creative Conflict Resolution’s Agreement to Mediate
includes a clause stating that “I agree to make a good faith
effort to resolve the above-referenced case.”179 These terms
operate by force of contract, bolstering existing regulatory
good faith obligations or filling the void where there are no
such obligations in applicable regulation.
i)

Australia
The Barristers and Solicitors Rules do not impose
an explicit obligation on legal representatives to mediate in
good faith.180 However, Section 27 of the Civil Procedure
Act in New South Wales places a duty on each party in
court-referred mediation to participate in good faith.181
There are similar obligations in subject matter specific
legislation such as the Farm Debt Mediation Act (in ss
11(1)(c)(iii), 11 (2)(a)) and Dust Diseases Tribunal
Regulation (in ss 27(1), 31(2)).182 Further, nonbinding
standards support such obligations. For example, the Law
Council of Australia’s Guidelines provide in clause 2.2 that
“Lawyers and clients should act, at all times, in good faith
to attempt to achieve settlement of the dispute.”183 Where
not explicitly stated, it is likely that obligations on the parties
in mediation extend to their lawyers because the parties
participate in the mediation wholly or partly through their
lawyers.184
179
NEW
YORK
CITY,
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oath/downloads/pdf/CCCR_Agreement_to_
Mediate_Online_MEND_Ca ses.pdf, (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
180
Wolski, On Mediation, supra note 19, at 21.
181
NSW
LEGISLATION,
https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act2005-028, (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
182
CAN LII, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-1997-c-21/latest/sc1997-c-21.html; NSW, Dust Diseases Tribunal Regulation 2019,
https://www.justice.nsw.gov.au/justicepolicy/Documents/dust-diseasestribunal-regulation-2019/dust-diseases-tribunal-regulation-2019.pdf.
183
LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 13.
184
ROBERT ANGYAL SC, ADVOCACY AT MEDIATION, IN RESOLVING CIVIL
DISPUTES 49 (Michael Legg ed., 2016).
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However, there is no clear definition of good faith
nor consideration of whether it regulates the truthfulness of
lawyers’ advocacy in mediation.185 Undoubtedly, what
good faith means varies amongst individuals, and as the
cases show, judges too.186 Some commentators examined it
through a narrow prism, labelling it as a “participation
duty”—although there is nothing to suggest it is so limited
in every case, particularly where regulation set out above,
such as the Law Council of Australia’s guidelines, extends
the obligation to “all times” in the process of settling a
dispute.187 Others suggested that there is general agreement
that good faith entails participating in mediation, ensuring
someone with authority to settle is present, and not
immediately rejecting what the other party says.188
However, it is widely accepted that good faith
obligations do not compel parties to act against their
interests, nor require them to fully disclose all information
relating to their interests, negotiation goals, and bargaining
positions.189 Wolski also explains that in Australia and the
United States, there is wide agreement that good faith does
not preclude use of positional negotiation, nor require
parties to make settlement offers.190 Further, she states that
good faith does not require parties to possess a sincere desire
to settle, and ultimately does not require forfeiture of a
person’s self-interest during mediation.191 Unfortunately,
there has been no explicit consideration of how such good
faith provisions apply to the truthfulness of lawyers’
185

See generally Lang, supra note 177.
See generally Lang, supra note 177.
187
LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 13.
188
Wolski, On Mediation, supra note 19, at 22.
189
United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales
(2009) 74 NSWLR 618 ¶ 76 (NSW); Masters Home Improvement Australia Pty
Ltd v North East Solutions Pty Ltd (2017) 372 ALR 440 ¶ 99 (Vic).
190
Wolski, supra, note 14, at 49.
191
Wolski, supra note 14, at 50.
186
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advocacy in mediation in Australia—particularly in relation
to lying, puffing, active misleading, and misrepresentation.
ii)

The United States
In the United States, twenty-two states and Guam
have statutory requirements relating to good faith in
mediation,192 and twenty-one Federal district courts and
seventeen state courts have good faith requirements in their
rules.193 Also, several federal district courts have relied on
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the basis
for a good faith requirement in mediation.194 U.S. cases
have also dealt with good faith mediation requirements, with
Lande analyzing twenty-seven relevant cases as falling into
five categories.195 Lande found that decisions were
consistent—as courts always found breaches of good faith
obligations where a party failed to attend or provide a
required pre-mediation document, an almost even split
where there was a failure to provide an authorized
representative, and no breaches for all other cases.196
However, like in Australia, there remains no direct
consideration of how good faith obligations apply to
regulate the truthfulness of lawyers’ advocacy in mediation.
iii)

Further Comparative Analysis
Little to no attention has been given to whether the
obligations of good faith set out above affect the truthfulness
of lawyers’ advocacy during mediation. It is suggested that
such obligations actually do regulate truthfulness based on
192
John Lande, Why a Good-Faith Requirement is a Bad Idea for Mediation,
23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1 (2005).
193
Lande, supra note 192.
194
ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Resolution on Good Faith
Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated
Mediation Programs, 2004 A.B.A SEC. OF DISP. RESOL.
195
John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good Faith
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69
(2002).
196
See generally Lande, supra note 195.
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the premise that lying or actively misleading in mediation
would constitute a party failing to participate in that
mediation in good faith.197 The term “good faith” is broad
enough to encompass such a reading. Unfortunately, there
is little judicial or academic guidance to confirm this
interpretation.
One of the issues in assessing good faith in
mediation is confidentiality. Confidentiality has prevented
courts from scrutinizing advocates’ conduct in mediation,
including their truthfulness, and therefore from considering
or holding whether duties of good faith apply to advocates’
truthfulness during mediation.198 As the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York has explained,
“confidentiality considerations preclude a court from
inquiring into the level of a party's participation in
mandatory court-ordered mediation, i.e., the extent to which
a party discusses the issues, listens to opposing viewpoints
and analyzes its liability.”199 Courts have therefore been left
to the very narrow “general pattern of interpretation” of
good faith “to require compliance with orders to attend
mediation, provide pre-mediation memoranda, and, in some
cases, produce organizational representatives with sufficient
settlement authority.”200
However, the lack of a definition of the term good
faith is the main issue precluding any definitive statement
that good faith duties regulate advocates’ truthfulness in
mediation. Most commentators agree that there is no clear
197
See generally David C. Singer and Cecilie Howard, The Duty of Good Faith
in Mediation Proceedings, 244 NEW YORK L. J. (Aug. 25, 2010),
http://files.dorsey.com/files/upload/The%20Duty%20of%20Good%20Faith.p
df.
198
Jeff D. Rifleman, Mediation Confidentiality, Bad Faith, Enforceability,
Rifleman
Law
&
Mediation
(Apr.
2008),
http://www.riflemanlaw.com/practice-areas/mediation/mediationconfidentiality-bad-faith-enforceability.
199
In re A.T. Reynolds & Sons Inc., 452 B.R. 374, 383–384 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
200
A.T. Reynolds & Sons Inc., 452 B.R. at 384.
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definition, and that the relevant cases in Australia and the
USA are difficult to reconcile.201 Some even posit that good
faith, especially substantive, as opposed to procedural, is a
concept that cannot ever be completely or accurately
defined.202 Consistently with those commentators, the New
York courts have gone so far to hold that good faith is an
“intangible and abstract quality with no technical
meaning.”203
The regulation examined above avoids providing
any guidance about the meaning of good faith. Apart from
the Australian and U.S. commentary and the U.S. cases
above, the meaning of good faith remains illusory.204 This
issue is compounded in Australia where there remains
uncertainty about whether the test under such regulation is
objective or subjective—as recent authority suggests an
objective test, while older authorities mandate a subjective
test.205
This definitional issue is a double-edged sword. On
one hand, it is problematic because it fails to impose a
uniform standard which lawyers can seek to adhere to and
by which they can be held accountable. It also promulgates
confusion about its proper meaning, evident in the paragraph
above. On the other hand, it creates a flexible standard
which may be interpreted as covering all sorts of mediator
conduct. In this way, it may also be considered a
prophylactic obligation—deterring improper lawyer
conduct while providing a tool for holding lawyers to
account for their actions during mediation.
201

Wolski, supra note 14, at 49 (and the sources there cited).
ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Resolution on Good Faith
Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated
Mediation Programs Opinion (August 7, 2004).
203
Martin v. Columbia Pictures Co., 133 N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953),
473, aff’d, 283 A.D. 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954), aff’d, 307 N.Y. 911 (1954).
204
Tania Sourdin, Good Faith, Bad Faith? Making an Effort in Dispute
Resolution, 2(1) DICTUM – VICT. L. SCH. J. (2012).
205
Angyal SC, supra note 184, at 51–55.
202
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For the purposes of this article, it is critical to note
that the courts have not yet extended the good faith
obligation to cover truthfulness in mediation.206 It is
submitted that this is not only because the question has not
arisen, but also because of the likely pushback from the
profession towards the courts extending good faith
obligations in the absence of rule makers doing so out of
respect for the separation of powers. The focus of lawyers
and academics on the specific rules relating to truthfulness
set out above—rather than good faith—has also taken
attention away from the possible application of good faith
obligations to regulating truthfulness. Despite this, there is
no reason to believe that such an extension is impossible, or
undesirable.
1e) Conflicting obligations
Regulation in Australia and the USA contains other
obligations which may conflict with those relating to the
truthfulness of lawyers’ advocacy in mediation. These are
supplemented by lawyers’ fiduciary and general law
duties—such as their general law duty of loyalty towards
their clients—which may contrast with their obligations
under relevant regulation. 207
The primary source of conflict is the duty owed to
the client. Solicitors’ Rule 4.1 provides that solicitors’
fundamental ethical duty is to act in their clients’ best
interests while Barristers Rule 37 provides that barristers
must promote and protect fearlessly the client’s best
interests by all proper and lawful means. While cast in
different and more comprehensive terms, similar obligations
of lawyers to their clients are evident in Model Rules 1.1–

206

See generally Lang, supra note 177.
See, e.g., Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 4.1.1, 10, 11, 12
(Austl.); Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 122–114 (Austl.).
207
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1.4.208 The potential for conflict is apparent from the text of
these rules, especially when clients instruct their lawyers to
act for them in a manner which is contrary to their legal
obligations, as occurred in the Mullins case mentioned
above.209
Model Rule 1.2 compels lawyers to abide by their
clients’ decisions concerning the objectives of
representation.210 If a client’s objective is to mislead or
withhold critical information from the other party during
mediation, this Rule would require the lawyer to abide. An
obvious clash emerges. The Comment to Rule 1.2 provides
guidance by reiterating that lawyers should only use “lawful
and ethical measures” to serve their clients’ objectives, are
not “bound to press for every advantage that might be
realized for a client,” and must “exercise professional
discretion.”211 Most relevant to truthfulness, it further states
that Rule 1.2 “does not require the use of offensive tactics”
– which likely covers the tactic of lying in mediation. 212
While this Rule is left to professional discretion, the text of
the Model Rules resolves other conflicts amongst the Rules.
For example, the obligation of confidentiality in Rule 1.6 is
expressly stated to trump Rule 4.1(b), through the words
“unless disclosure is prohibited by 1.6.”213
In Australia, it is well established that if there is a
conflict between the duties owed to a client and those owed
to the administration of justice, the latter prevails.214 In
other words, the duty to the court (i.e. to the mediator),
trumps every other conflicting duty (like under Solicitors
Rule 3.1). However, outside this type of conflict, there is
208

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1–1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
[2006] LPT 012.
210
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
211
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
212
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
213
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
214
Giannarelli v. Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543, 556–57; Rondel v. Worsley
(1969) 1 AC 191, 227–28; Solicitors Rule 3.1; Barristers Rule 5.
209
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little guidance. NSW has held that where there is a conflict
between duties owed to a client and duties owed to a third
party, those owed to the client prevail.215 Yet, it is unclear
how extensible this principle is—and to what types of duties
it applies. In the USA, the only guidance is in the Preamble
to the Model Rules, which states that conflicts “must be
resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and
moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying
the Rules.”216
As such, methods for resolving conflicts
concerning lawyer’s truthfulness obligations remain largely
unresolved in each jurisdiction. This is apt to cause
confusion for some practitioners, allowing them to bend the
truth during mediation and hide behind the veil of acting in
the interests of their clients. While a bright-line rule about
resolving all types of conflicts between lawyers’ obligations
may be undesirable (because it would be rigid and difficult
to apply to all rules and in all factual contexts), it would be
helpful to provide more explicit guidance about how to
resolve conflicts between the rules. For example, Model
Rule 4.1 and the equivalents in Australia might be amended
to make it clear that where lawyers perceive their clients’
instructions to potentially contravene such rules, they are to
inform their clients that they cannot act in accordance with
that instruction because of the operation of the relevant
rules, and should refuse to act in accordance with that
instruction despite the client’s insistence. Attention should
also be given to expand the grounds for voluntary lawyer
withdrawal in such situations.

215

Law Society of New South Wales v. Harvey (1976) 2 NSWLR 154, 170.
AMERICAN
BAR,
Ethics
2020
Commission
Preamble,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_preamble/,
(April 2, 2020).

216
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2)

HOW THE RULES SHAPE CONDUCT,
AND HOW THEY CAN BE IMPROVED
After reading the above, one might ask: If all
lawyers lie and actively mislead during mediation, then why
does it matter? There is a level—albeit potentially
unethical—playing field. Norton takes this view, positing
that so long as deception does not endanger the validity of
an agreement, then it should be permissible because
participants can use the process to produce a balance
between truth and a fair result.217
This Part argues that the regulation of
untruthfulness in mediation is important and proposes that
the rules be clarified to more effectively achieve their
purposes.
2a) Desirability of clarifying the rules relating to
truthfulness
Noting the ambiguity and gaps in the coverage of
the rules in relation to truthfulness in mediation assessed
above, the relevant rules in each jurisdiction should be
amended so that their meaning and the scope of their
application is clearer. In the case of Model Rule 4.1, for the
reasons set out above it is likely that the most desirable
approach would be to prohibit lies altogether.
In any case, amendments will not automatically
change behavior and norms in mediation, as these depend on
the lawyers involved. However, amendment is likely to
incrementally alter conduct, clarify the expectations of
lawyers in mediation, and at least make lawyers secondguess whether their conduct accords with the relevant
rules.218 It will also temper the often-substantial distance

217
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 493, 532, 545 (1989).
218
See generally Norton, supra note 217, at 532, 541–551.
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between common practice and ethical standards in
negotiation.219
i)

Lies And Puffing
If lawyers are permitted to lie in the manner now
allowed by Model Rule 4.1, then clarity is particularly
important in relation to the types of facts lawyers may lie
about during mediation in the USA. Clarity will also help
in ascertaining how the good faith obligations apply in both
Australia and the USA in relation to advocates’ truthfulness
in mediation. Clarity in these two areas is likely to reduce
current debate and uncertainty, and provide lawyers with a
useful, practical guide of conduct during mediation.220
Clarification in relation to lying, puffing, and good
faith may be achieved by providing further examples of what
type of conduct is acceptable or not under the relevant
rules—to complement the existing case law and guidance—
which is not helpful for the reasons set out above. This may
be achieved by the relevant Australian and U.S. rules
identifying, akin to the ABA Section for Dispute
Resolution’s proposal for addressing good faith
requirements in mediation, “objectively-determinable
conduct”221 that is permissible and impermissible. For
example, in relation to lying, it might be identified that
where the central issue of a dispute being mediated is the
value of certain property, then it is impermissible for a
lawyer to lie about the value of that property.
Such identification of impermissible, objectivelydeterminable conduct will provide participants with a
clearer understanding of the behavior that can lead to
219

Norton, supra note 217, at 502–03.
See generally Norton, supra note 217, at 532, 541–551.
221
Resolution on Good Faith Requirements for Mediators and Mediation
Advocates in Court-Mandated Mediation Programs, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. DISP.
RESOL.
2,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/dispute_resolution/dispute_resolution/draftres2.pdf.
220
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sanctions; promote certainty in conduct during mediation;
and therefore stimulate appropriate conduct by lawyers.222
This development would be especially desirable because of
the existence of the discretionary, circumstance-dependent
tests for determining the status of statements and the lack of
a definition of “good faith.”223 Clarification in each area
would provide lawyers with important guidance about what
is an acceptable statement under the relevant rules, and
about how to act in “good faith” during mediations.
In relation to Model Rule 4.1, Peters has also
suggested its extension to prohibit all false statements about
“interests and priorities.”224 This would make Model Rule
4.1 more akin to the Australian rules (which are not limited
to statements about “material facts”). The writers take this
further, suggesting that for reasons explained above, a
blanket prohibition on lies is appropriate.225
As Peters explains, such a step is justified in
circumstances where reported decisions and anecdotal
evidence suggests that lawyers even lie about material facts
in mediation (despite the current Model Rule 4.1prohibiting
this).226 Empirical evidence also supports this change as it
suggests that lawyers lie about material facts regularly when
negotiating.227 For example, a survey of a national sample
of lawyers in the USA found 51% believed that inadequate
disclosure of material information is a regular problem,228
and another survey of civil litigators in Illinois, Indiana, and

222

Resolution on Good Faith, supra note 221.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
224
Peters, supra note 61, at 134, 139, and the sources there cited.
225
Peters, supra note 61, at 139.
226
Peters, supra note 61, at 124 and the sources there cited.
227
Art Henshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study
of Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 95, 114
(2011).
228
Steven D. Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations: Interim Report and
Preliminary Findings (1983) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with New York
University Law Review).
223
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Michigan found 20% believed that their opposing lawyers
routinely lied about material facts.229
ii)
Mediation-Specific Rules
In both the USA and Australia, it is desirable to adopt
enforceable rules which are specific to mediation advocacy,
or to clarify how rules of general application apply to
mediation. The various difficulties in relying on rules of
general application have been identified in the analysis
above. Further, the current general rules are drafted for a
court context in which lawyers are considered partial,
zealous advocates,230 whereas mediation-specific rules will
enable more appropriate and specialized regulation of
conduct in the less adversarial context of mediation. As
Wolski posits, it will prevent lawyers in mediation from
being reduced to amoral gladiators, amoral technicians, and
hired guns,231 and it will protect the reputation of mediation
as a collaborative and efficient process for resolving
disputes. Further reasons for such clarification of the rules
will be provided in the analysis below.
2b) Lawyers’ attitudes and conduct
iii. Why The Imperfection Of Enforcement
Warrants Clarification Of The Rules
The enforcement of the relevant rules in Australia
and the U.S. gives them practical significance and
establishes their ability to regulate lawyers’ conduct during
mediation.
In Australia, both the Solicitors and Barristers
Rules have significant force. They are enforceable through
229
Ibid; Robert B. Gordon, Note, Private Settlement as Alternative
Adjudication: A Rationale For Negotiation Ethics, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
503, 508 n.29 (1985).
230
Wolski, supra note 14, at 31.
231
Wolski, supra note 14, at 31.
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state statutes.232 For example, in New South Wales, section
298(b) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 provides
that “conduct consisting of a contravention of the Uniform
Rules” can constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct or
the more serious professional misconduct.233
In
circumstances of such a finding, section 302 of that Act also
empowers the designated disciplinary tribunal to make
orders including for removal from the professional roll,
imposing conditions on practicing certificates, and
suspending or cancelling practicing certificates.234 These
are serious sanctions that may be imposed for a breach of the
above rules. It is also worth noting that the damage to
reputation caused by an allegation of a breach of the
Solicitors or Barristers Rules has a significant impact in
deterring improper conduct in mediation.235 This is also true
in the U.S. in relation to the Model Rules.236
In the U.S., there are many methods for enforcing
compliance with the Model Rules. Model Rules 8.4 and 8.5
provide a basis for the relevant disciplinary authority to
bring an action against a lawyer for misconduct—with broad
grounds set out in 8.4 for a finding of “professional
misconduct.”237 This is similar to section 298 of the Legal
Profession Uniform Law 2014.238 Significant consequences
arise from a breach of the Model Rules.239 The ABA’s
Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439 cites numerous cases where
disciplinary action has been successfully brought against
lawyers for breaching Model Rule 4.1 resulting in sanctions
against lawyers such as striking off or suspension, the setting
232
NEW SOUTH WALES BAR ASSOCIATION, Barrister Rules,
https://nswbar.asn.au/bar-standards/barristers-rules, (last visited Sept. 20,
2020).
233
Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (N.S.W.) s 298 (Austl.).
234
Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (N.S.W.) s 302 (Austl.).
235
Lawrence, supra note 176, at 36.
236
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
237
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
238
Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (N.S.W.) s 298 (Austl.).
239
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
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aside of settlement agreements, and civil malpractice
lawsuits against the lawyers themselves.240 For example, in
one case, a lawyer was suspended from practice for three
years for repeated, abusive behavior during mediations.241
Lawyers have also been subject to costs sanctions for their
client’s failure to appear at a mediation.242
Outside the Model Rules, similarly to Australian
courts, courts in each U.S. state have an inherent power to
regulate the conduct of admitted lawyers in and out of
court.243
Actions may also be brought for lawyer
malpractice and negligence and for breaches of contracts
between lawyers and clients.244 These are rare in Australia,
but more common in the U.S. because of the potential for
punitive damages to be awarded in some U.S. states.245
U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16,
particularly 16(f), provides another basis for which
disciplinary action may be brought against a lawyer for their
conduct during mediation—namely for failing to appear,
being substantially unprepared to participate, not
participating in good faith, or failing to obey pretrial
orders.246 This action may result in personal or costs
240

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
In re Fletcher, 424 F.3d 783, 785, 795 (8th Cir. 2005).
242
Doorstop Beverages of Longwood, Inc. v. Collier, 928 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
243
SUP. CT. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., APP. DIV., SECOND JUD. DEP’T, Attorney
Matters,
Regulation
of
Legal
Profession,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad2/attorneymatters_ComplaintAboutaLawy
er.shtml#:~:text=Lawyers%20are%20admitted%20to%20practice,the%20cour
se%20of%20their%20career.&text=To%20guide%20and%20regulate%20the,
(22%20NYCRR%20part%201200). (last visited Sep. 11, 2020).; Ariz. R. Sup.
Ct. 3.
244
E.g., Can I Sue My Lawyer for Negligence, Stanfer Stanfield Law, (Jul. 12,
2020) https://www.stangerlaw.com/blog/sue-lawyer-negligence/.
245
Metcalfe v. Waters, 970 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Tenn. 1998); Clauson v.
Kirshenbaum, C.A. No. 92-3410, 1996 R.I. Super. LEXIS 23, at 13-14 (Super.
Ct. Jan. 19, 1996).
246
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) (2020).
241
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sanctions against the relevant lawyer under Rule 16(f), as
federal courts have used the rule to sanction bad faith in
mediation.247 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides an additional basis
for costs sanctions against a lawyer who commits
misconduct.248
The enforceability of the above provisions in both
Australia and the U.S. ensures that they play a key role in
deterring improper conduct and incentivizing lawyers to act
truthfully in mediation. However, difficulties in enforcing
the obligations justify the clarification of lawyers’ existing
obligations. These difficulties include the nature of
mediation as a non-public forum, where it is difficult for
opposing parties and the mediator to discover lies or
mistruths—as without discovery processes and the
presentation of objective evidence, the parties are
susceptible to the information provided to them by the other
parties, and have no opportunity to test the truthfulness of
assertions made during mediation. More than in other
contexts, rules can therefore be violated with confidence that
there will be no enforcement nor punishment for
breaches.249
This is particularly so in circumstances where no
agreement is reached at mediation and therefore no reliance
or loss as well as no transcript or record of the mediation,
which makes it hard to prove misconduct. As the Court
explained in Otto, courts struggle to find breaches of ethical
rules because there is no record and the parties’ memories
are often “hazy at best,” so the relevant court or tribunal
“cannot verify what statements were actually made and what
documents were presented” during mediations.250 All of the
above makes clarity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures
247

Lawrence, supra note 176, at 55; FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) (2020).
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance 2020).
249
White, supra note 109, at 926.
250
Otto v. Hearst Commc’ns, No. 17-CV-4712, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35051,
at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2019).
248
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essential to assist enforcement efforts by establishing clear
expectations and to prevent lawyers hiding behind the
unlikelihood of enforcement, often bred by ambiguity in the
rules, to advocate untruthfully in mediation.

iv.

Why The Incentive For Lawyers To Lie
Warrants Clarification Of The Rules
As humans, lawyers’ behavior is affected by
innumerable factors. In the context of mediation, there are
certain factors which consistently shape lawyers’ conduct
and advocacy. Some of these factors provide lawyers with
an incentive to lie during mediation and, therefore, support
the clarification of the rules to counter these incentives.
First, mediation has become increasingly
adversarial, and the approaches lawyers have employed
during mediation have become increasingly similar to those
in court proceedings.251 Relis’ research in the USA revealed
that lawyers viewed mediation as a tactical, adversarial
process which could be used strategically to convey certain
information and confidentially communicate directly with
the other side.252 Lawyers have therefore been injected with
a motive to win at all costs, which can often lead to
sacrificing the truth.253 This is particularly so in the USA,
where it is submitted there is a starker culture of distrust
amongst practitioners—so evident that states such as New
York have adopted Standards of Civility applicable to
lawyers, which is a development not fathomed in Australia

251
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR Representation: A Roadmap of
Critical Issues, 4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 3–4 (1997).
252
TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS,
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS, AND GENDERED PARTIES 194 (2009).
253
Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining
Civility as an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99,
106–07 (2011) (discussing how lawyers will lie in order to “get a leg up over
opposing counsel.”)
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largely because it is assumed that lawyers would inherently
display such civility.254
Second, there is often an inequality of resources and
bargaining power between the parties to a mediation.255
This inequality may lead the lawyer representing the less
powerful side to employ tactics, such as lying and active
misrepresentation, to equalize this inequality.256 This is
problematic in circumstances where there is ambiguity in the
applicable rules, because combined with the inequality, it
provides fuel for a lawyer to lie.257 The same may also be
said for an inequality in the experience or expertise of
counsel, because less experienced counsel may flaunt with
the ambiguity in the relevant rules and tell lies to
compensate for their inexperience.258 Peters similarly
explains that lawyers who lie during mediations often
display lesser skill levels and lack comprehensive
preparation.259
An imbalance of power may also arise in a different
context—where one party is represented by a lawyer but the
other is not.260 Such inequality may render telling lies
particularly influential in the mediation. A serious question
emerges about whether the lawyer should be subject to a
heightened duty of disclosure in such circumstances to
254
Paula Baron & Lillian Corbin, The Unprofessional Professional: Do
Lawyers Need Rules? (2017). [source needed—based on abstract of article;
discusses Australia’s lawyer-civility standard]; see also Campbell, supra note
253, at 106–107.
255
See Elaine Smith, Danger-Inequality of Resources Present: Can the
Environmental Mediation Process Provide an Effective Answer, 1996 J. DISP.
RESOL. 379, 381 (1996).
256
Campbell, supra note 253, at 106–107.
257
Campbell, supra note 253, at 106 (2011) (“[T]he stated purpose of civility
codes is to ‘clarify and to articulate important values held by many members of
the bench and the bar’ by placing expected standards of civility in one
document.”).
258
Relis, supra note 124, at 159.
259
Peters, supra note 61, at 141.
260
See generally Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation, Self-Represented Parties,
and Access to Justice: From There to Here, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 78 (2019).
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counter the obvious imbalance of power arising from the
unrepresented party’s likely inability to identify mediation
tactics, or the nuances of the law.261 The potential for
unrepresented parties to unwittingly believe and rely on lies,
or to be actively misled, also puts mediators “in a difficult
conflict between their obligations to remain impartial and to
promote a level of informed consent essential to selfdetermination.”262 However, in the same sense it might be
argued that the unrepresented party is also able to freely lie
or tell mistruths, and often being a non-lawyer, is more
likely to do so. So, while this may be an area for future
reform, it is likely to be subject to debate.
Third, lawyers’ personalities and the dynamics of
relationships between lawyers may urge some to push the
line where there is lenient regulation of truth.263 Lawyers’
characters and interactions have “material effects on all
actors’ mediation experiences and results,” and on truth in
mediation.264 Related to this, tensions between lawyers’
conceptions as representatives of a profession subject to
specific rules of conduct and as businesspeople seeking the
best outcome for their client impacts adherence to the rules
relating to truthfulness.265
The impact of lawyers’
relationships on truthfulness is especially prevalent where
there is distrust engendered through past practice, because
lawyers are then more likely to lie because they believe the
other side will do the same to obtain advantage.266
261

Cf. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT
r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
262
Peters, supra note 61, at 132.
263
See generally Peters, supra note 61, at 141–42.
264
Relis, supra note 124, at 158.
265
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution 360
(2003).
266
William Wan & Sarah Kaplan, Why Liars Lie: What science tells us about
deception, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2018, 8:46 A.M. CDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-
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These factors heighten the importance of clarifying
the requirements of the rules relating to truth in mediation
so that lawyers do not take advantage of ambiguity or a lack
of coverage in the rules for ulterior motives such as those
above.
2c) The perception of mediation and its utility in
resolving disputes
The way truth is regulated during mediation affects
the integrity and public perception of mediation as a process
for resolving disputes.267 Loose regulation is likely to lead
to a race to the bottom for truth and transform mediation into
an even more adversarial forum in which both sides expect
the other to lie or misrepresent matters for their gain. This
provides an environment in which lawyers may believe they
have greater opportunity and perhaps even impunity for
mistruths, leading to the proliferation of falsity in
mediation.268 This impacts the integrity of the mediation
process and urges parties to prefer court litigation because it
is viewed as the only true forum of truth. It is also likely to
diminish the collaborative spirit of mediation and one of
mediation’s primary advantages—to preserve relationships
between the parties while resolving a dispute.269
Loosely regulating truth also undermines
mediation’s potential to explore and reach alternative
outcomes for the parties beyond the win-lose outcomes of
adjudication.270 Lies prevent parties from discovering joint
gains and inhibit mediators’ abilities to explore interests and

science/wp/2018/08/24/why-liars-lie-what-science-tells-us-about-falsestatements/ (referencing a study that found people lie more when others are
being dishonest).
267
Wan & Kaplan, supra note 266.
268
Wan & Kaplan, supra note 266.
269
The Liberty Group, 8 Benefits of Mediation, The Liberty Group (June 8,
2017), http://thelibertygroup.com.au/8-benefits-of-mediation/.
270
See Peters, supra note 61, at 138.

418

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss2/2

64

Angyal and Saady: Legal Lying?
[Vol. 21: 355, 2021]

Legal Lying?
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

help the parties develop complimentary outcomes.271 Lies
also undesirably assist parties to divide the outcome pie
favorably in their interest but do not help expand that pie for
the benefit of all.272
Additionally, loosely regulating truth will likely
inhibit the efficiency of mediation as an ADR process. For
example, if lying about facts is condoned, it will require
lawyers to expend resources in checking and verifying all
factual representations of their opposition.273 It is apt to
undermine the purposes of the mediation in the courtcontext, such as reducing docket congestion, aiding
effective judicial administration, and promoting productive
negotiation outside of court.274 Like the Queensland Court
of Appeal said in Mullins: “[p]robity is essential to the utility
of mediation as a form of alternative dispute resolution.”275
At a personal level, lawyers and parties are unlikely
to take mediation seriously if they know the other side is
allowed to regularly lie about significant matters because of
the ambiguity of the applicable rules.276 As is explained in
the ABA’s Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439, this is especially
because a neutral mediator is involved, and communication
deteriorates as mediators loop statements made by the
parties.277 Further, ambiguity in the rules is likely to deter
parties from settling a matter at mediation because they
271

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality, and Professional Responsibility
in Negotiation, Dispute Resolution Ethics: A Comprehensive Guide 147
(Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002).
272
Peters, supra note 61, at 139.
273
See David R. Hague, Fraud on the Court and Abusive Discovery, 16 NEV.
L. J. 707, 711–12 (2016) (providing examples of attorney trickery during
discovery).
274
Keepoutofcourt.com, Benefits of Mediation, Keep Out of Court,
https://www.keepoutofcourt.com/benefits-of-mediation/.
275
Legal Services Commissioner v Voll [2008] QCA 293 [67] (Wilson J), [1]
and [70] (Keane JA and Dutney J agreeing) (Austl.).
276
Wan & Kaplan, supra note 266.
277
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
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suspect that any settlement will be based on mistruths and
misrepresentations made during mediation.278 Instead,
parties will likely wait until a court trial where there are
more comprehensive methods for uncovering the truth.279
While some commentators argue that deception is
inherent in all negotiation and that the parties accept the
loose regulation of truth as intrinsic to mediation,280 for the
reasons stated above, more comprehensive and clearer
regulation of truthfulness will likely preserve mediation’s
long-term legitimacy as a dispute resolution process.
We can, and should, do better. Appropriate
amendments will help ensure mediation consistently
produces fair and just outcomes and improve the durability
of agreements reached. It will also enable mediators to more
effectively foster joint, interest-based negotiating and use
privately shared information to create value for the parties,
ultimately preserving mediation's potential as a viable forum
for interest-based negotiating.281
CONCLUSION
The comparative analysis undertaken above shows
that the Australian rules more comprehensively and strictly
regulate truth in mediation. Yet, like their U.S. counterparts,
there remain gaps and ambiguities within the rules, such as
in relation to the application of good faith requirements,
which should be addressed.
The Australian experience shows that crafting rules
relating to the truthfulness of lawyers’ advocacy during
278
Robert J. Burns, Jr., Mediation Techniques and Why Honesty Is Always the
Best
Policy,
Perry
Dampf
Dispute
Solutions,
5,
https://www.perrydampf.com/docs/Mediation-Techniques-Honesty-AlwaysBest-Policy.pdf.
279
See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(3) (2020); Hague, supra note 273, 709–10
(mentioning the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have a process for
determining fraud on the court).
280
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
281
Peters, supra note 61, at 139.
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mediation is not difficult if lawyers are required always to
be truthful. On the other hand, the U.S. experience with
Model Rule 4.1(a) shows that, if lawyers are allowed to lie
when negotiating, it is not possible to draft a morally and
intellectually justifiable rule that draws a bright line between
permissible and impermissible lying. This is because, as
explained above, the drafting exercise is inherently selfcontradictory.
Model Rule 4.1(a) was a retrograde step in 1983 in
the regulation of the truthfulness of lawyers.282 In the
writers’ view, it should be amended to require lawyers
always to be truthful. If there is no appetite to amend Model
Rule 4.1(a), it is suggested that the U.S. will benefit from
greater clarity in the rules relating to truthfulness in
mediation, particularly through the changes suggested in
Part Two of this article.
The changes advocated in this article will address
the difficulties in enforcing the rules, counter lawyers’
incentives to lie, provide lawyers with practical guidance
about what is permissible and impermissible behavior
during mediation, prophylactically deter lawyer misconduct,
help achieve the fundamental purposes of mediation, and
enhance its legitimacy as a dispute resolution process.

282

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
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